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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which we are 
lawfully allowed to draw upon our cultural environment as part of our 
discursive practices.   To what extent are we ‘free’ to access and reutilise 
that which surrounds us? 
 
At the Straight Out of Brisbane Arts Festival in December 2004 a 
participant explained that they could go out into the forest and paint a 
picture of the trees without breaching any intellectual property laws, yet to 
paint a picture of the human made environment of billboards that line the 
M1 Highway between Brisbane and the Gold Coast could breach the law.  
They explained that sampling their environment was like using the English 
language in the process of talking and billboards as much as the trees were 
part of their cultural environment. What right did they have to ‘jam’ with 
these artefacts of modern day life?  What right did they have to sample 
music or culture more broadly as part of their creative activity? 
 
The fact that people want to utilise their environment in their creative 
activity is not the only point to note here. Nowadays technology is making 
this even easier to achieve. New digital technologies along with the Internet 
have opened up enormous potential for what has become known as ‘remix’ 
– cutting, pasting, mashing, sampling etc. No longer are end users or 
consumers seen as passive receptors of information, but rather in the 
process of distributed and peer production, consumers can take on the role 
of producers to become what Creative Commons legal counsel Mia Garlick 
calls ‘content conducers’.46  
 
Specifically, this article will consider the legal issues that arise in relation 
to the distinct yet related creative and social practices of remix known as 
digital (music) sampling and culture jamming.  The picture is not 
particularly encouraging. There appears little scope for sampling music 
without the permission of the copyright owner under fair dealing 
                                                 
46 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to 
Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (2004) New York, Penguin Press, 283-4.   
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(Australia) or fair use (USA) doctrines, especially in relation to the sound 
recording and especially where there is no ‘transformative’ use.47  While 
Australian law will still consider whether a ‘substantial part’ of the original 
material has been reproduced through the sampling, the approach in the 
recent US decision of Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc,48 
applying a somewhat similar quantitative/qualitative test is to suggest that 
any copying of the sound recording will amount to an infringement. It is 
unclear to what extent Australian courts would follow this decision and 
decide that copying any amount of a sound recording is a reproduction of a 
substantial part of the original material. The suggestion is that Australian 
courts should not adopt the Bridgeport approach as a rigorous ‘substantial 
part’ doctrine informed by an understanding of the creative innovation 
system49 - especially in its digital and remix aspects – is vital to allowing 
flexibility in our copyright system and innovation in our information 
society. The limitation of fair dealing doctrine in promoting innovation 
makes this even more apparent. The implementation of a more tolerant 
doctrine of fair use so as to facilitate creative innovation (through the 
current review of fair use by the Commonwealth Attorney-General)50 and 
widespread use of modalities such as permission in advance Creative 
Commons styled licences provide hope for the creative class that some 
sampling will be allowed.  The expectation that every second or note of 
recorded music must be paid for and therefore cannot be utilised without 
permission is too rigid and ignores the fact that the creativity of today 
builds on that of the past quite often without any compensation being 
paid.51   
 
In relation to culture jamming and copyright and trademark law, once again 
Australian law is deficient in providing clear guidance as to the extent to 
                                                 
47 On the notion of “transformative use” see Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc 510 U.S 
569 (1994). 
48 401 F 3d 647 (6th Cir, 2004), en banc rehearing and revised opinion 410 F 3d. 792 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
49 On this notion see A Fitzgerald and B Fitzgerald, Intellectual Property in Principle 
Chapter 1; John Howkins, The Creative Economy: how people make money from ideas, 
(2001) London, Penguin; John Hartley (ed.), Creative Industries (2005) Oxford, 
Blackwell, 2005; DCITA, Creative Industries Cluster Study Volumes 1-3 (2004) 
ww.dcita.gov.au. 
50 See further, B Fitzgerald “Fair Use for “Creative Innovation”: A Principle We Must 
Embrace. A Submission in Response to the A-G’s Issues Paper on Fair Use and Other 
Copyright Exceptions” (2005) 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp 
51 Emerson v Davies 8 F. Cas 615 at 619 (C.C. Mas. 1845); W Landes and R Posner, 
“An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law” (1989) J. Legal Stud. 325 at 332.   
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which creativity can draw upon the surrounding environment. US copyright 
and trademark law permits a degree of culture jamming by way of trade 
mark parody, yet Australian law is largely silent on this issue. To this end 
Australian law needs to clearly define the extent to which trade marks, 
particularly well known marks, can be utilised without the permission of 
the copyright and trademark owner for political, social and creative 
activity. In a vibrant democracy we deserve the right to remix and jam with 
these cultural artefacts to ‘some degree’.    
 
 
Music Sampling 
 
Introduction 
The term music sampling refers to the process by which a producer or artist 
making a recording, samples a sound or series of sounds from its original 
context and then makes a new use of it. In its more technical sense this 
process is referred to as digital sampling, which involves the use of digital 
technology to enable the recording and storage of sounds and their 
reproduction in a host of aural formats.52 This process is achieved by 
breaking down the wave forms that characterise the different sounds and 
converting them into a precise numerical form.53 This information is then 
coded into a digital synthesiser, enabling the artist or producer to 
manipulate the sound bites (samples) in a number of different pitches, 
echoes, speeds, tones and rhythmic combinations.54 The courts have taken a 
similar approach to these generic industry definitions in considering what 
music sampling and digital sampling encompass. Most recently in 
Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc,55 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the 6th Circuit held that digital sampling is a term of art, in 
adopting the definition commonly accepted within the music industry. In 
Newton v Diamond,56 Schroeder CJ held that ‘sampling entails the 
incorporation of short segments of prior sound recordings into new 
recordings.’ Similarly, in Jarvis v A & M Records,57 Ackerman DJ held that 
digital sampling involves the conversion of analog sound waves into digital 
                                                 
52 Paul Weiler, Entertainment, Media, and the Law (2nd ed, 2002) 412. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid 413.  
55 401 F 3d 647, 655 (6th Cir, 2004); 410 F 3d 792, 798 (6th Cir 2005). 
56 349 F 3d 591, 596 (9th Cir, 2003). 
57 827 F Supp 282, 286 (DNJ, 1993). 
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code. Elaborating on this process Ackerman DJ described it ‘as similar to 
taping the original composition and reusing it in another context.’58   
 
This notion of sampling is not a novel or new one, indeed it may well be 
argued that it is something which is a part of culture and freedom of 
expression that has been alive for centuries. However, the origins of 
sampling in its current musical and digital context can be traced to the 
reggae musicians of Jamaica in the 1960’s who in turn influenced the rap 
and hip-hop culture in urban New York in the late 1970’s.59 It was here that 
an African-American musician from the Bronx, Afrika Bambaata pioneered 
the practice we now know as music sampling.60 Through sampling the 
electronic beats of German pop group Kraftwerk, Bambaata was able to lay 
the foundations for an entirely new culture of music, which embraced the 
use of sampling.61 Today this practice of music sampling is not only 
confined to rap and hip-hop culture. Its influence can also be seen in 
movements like pop, funk, dance, house, techno, trip-hop and acid jazz.62  
 
An ability to sample lawfully yet without the permission of the copyright 
owner is an important part of a dynamic creative innovation system 
because it allows content (e.g a portion song) to be negotiated 
instantaneously and without friction. Under copyright law we are entitled 
under certain conditions (including payment of a statutory licence fee) to 
record a song without the permission of the copyright owner of the song63 
but we cannot copy a sound recording of a song unless we have the 
permission of the copyright owner of the sound recording. If we are 
allowed to sample a sound recording without permission then a road block 
or veto power over creativity is removed and a space for re-use or free 
culture is opened up. Having to pay for samples might also prove expensive 
for an artist who merely wants to experiment with sounds in a process of 
creativity.64  The focus of this article then is to ask - when can sampling be 
undertaken without the permission of the relevant copyright owner and 
without the need to pay compensation?   
                                                 
58 Jarvis v A & M Records, 827 F Supp 282, 286 (DNJ, 1993). 
59 Rachael Carnachan, “Sampling and the Music Industry: A Discussion of the 
Implications of Copyright Law” (1999) 8(4) Auckland University Law Review 1033. 
See also Newton v Diamond 349 F. 3d. 591 at 593 (6th Cir 2003).   
60 Rachael Carnachan, supra at 593. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Copyright Act 1968 ss 54-65. 
64 “A New Spin On Music Sampling: A Case For Fair Play” (1992) 105 Harvard Law 
Review 726 at 727-8. 
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What Does Copyright Law Allow? 
In determining what copyright law will allow in relation to music sampling, 
it is first necessary to identify the relevant rights which may exist in 
original material. Under the Copyright Act a single composition of recorded 
music may give rise to a number of different types of copyright. These 
include economic rights in the literary work (lyrics), musical work (score), 
sound recording and performance of the song as well as moral rights in the 
lyrics, score and more recently performance of the song. Each of these 
rights will be considered separately below.    
 
In regards to the literary and musical aspect of recorded music, s 32 of the 
Copyright Act provides protection for an original literary and musical work. 
In the context of music sampling, song lyrics are recognised as a literary 
work and are therefore afforded protection under the Copyright Act.65 
There is no definition of a musical work however, it is generally accepted 
that this category protects the method of production, rather than any artistic 
or aesthetic qualities of the work.66 Under this any combination of sounds 
and noises will be protected by copyright, provided it is in a fixed form.67 
Copyright infringement in either the literary or musical work will occur 
where the sampler does any of the acts within the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights.68 In the case of music sampling this will most often occur 
where the literary or musical work is reproduced in a material form.69 In 
order to prove infringement in either the literary or musical work the 
copyright owner will need to show that the infringing sample was a 
reproduction of the original work, and that a substantial part has been 
reproduced.70 These two requirements are discussed in detail below in 
relation to copyright in a sound recording.71 
                                                 
65 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1). 
66 Anne Fitzgerald and Brian Fitzgerald, Intellectual Property in Principle (2004) 
Thomson Sydney  99. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 36 - including the right to reproduce the work in a 
material form, to perform the work in public, to communicate the work to the public, or 
to make an adaptation of the work: s 31 (1).  
69 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 31(1)(a)(i). 
70 Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald, supra, 144. 
71 Note that the Bridgeport decision suggests that this analysis be undertaken separately 
for the lyrics/music and sound recording as reproduction of a substantial part of a sound 
recording brings into play different considerations: 401 F. 3d 647 at 655 (6th Cir, 2004).  
Cf  “Amici Curiae Brief of Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School and EFF in 
Bridgeport Rehearing”  21 January 2005 
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The other right in relation to recorded music and the one which is most 
commonly associated with music sampling is copyright in a sound 
recording. A sound recording is defined to mean the aggregate sounds 
embodied in a record and will therefore extend to the recording of sounds 
on the most common medium, CD.72 Under s 85(1) of the Copyright Act an 
owner of copyright in a sound recording has the exclusive right to make a 
copy of the sound recording, cause the recording to be heard in public, 
communicate the recording to the public and enter into a commercial rental 
arrangement in respect of the recording. Copyright infringement in a sound 
recording will occur where a person who is not the copyright owner does 
any of the acts within the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.73 This most 
commonly occurs in music sampling where a copy of the sound recording 
is made which embodies the original recording. In order to prove the 
infringement of copyright, the copyright owner will need to show that the 
infringing sample was a reproduction of the original material, and that a 
substantial part of the original sound recording has been reproduced.74     
 
The first of these requirements is that there must have been a reproduction 
of the original sound recording. What this requires is that there must be ‘a 
sufficient degree of objective similarity between the two works’ and ‘some 
causal connection between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s work’.75 In the 
context of music sampling what must be shown is that the sample embodies 
the actual sounds from the original sound recording.76 In order to establish 
this it is useful to rely upon digital sound technology, which is able to 
detect whether the sounds that are embodied in the original sound recording 
have been reproduced.77 This is achieved by isolating the original sound 
recording and the sample.78 A sampler is then used to graph the amounts of 
particular frequencies in the sounds, thereby establishing if there has been a 
reproduction of the original sound recording.79 
 
                                                                                                                                               
<http://www.fepproject.org/courtbriefs/bridgeport.pdf> See also Newton v Diamond 
349 F. 3d. 591 (6th Cir 2003)  
72 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1). 
73 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 101(1). 
74 Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald, above n 33, 144. 
75 Francis Day & Hunter Ltd v Bron [1963] Ch 587, 614. 
76 Helen Townley, ‘Sampling: Weapon of the Copyright Pirate?’ (1993) 12(1) 
University of Tasmania Law Review 102, 105.  
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
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Assuming there has been a reproduction of the original sound recording, it 
is then necessary to consider the second requirement of whether a 
substantial part of the original sound recording has been reproduced.80 The 
issue which arises here and one which is particularly crucial in regards to 
music sampling as most cases concern the use of very short samples, is 
what will amount to a substantial part? The general test for a substantial 
part was stated by Lord Pearce in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill 
(Football) Ltd81 as ‘whether a part is substantial must be decided by its 
quality rather than its quantity.’ This test was affirmed by Mason CJ in 
Autodesk Inc v Dyason (No 2)82 who held that ‘in determining whether the 
quality of what is taken makes it a ‘substantial part’ of the copyright work, 
it is important to inquire into the importance which the taken portion bears 
in relation to the work as whole: is it an essential or material part of the 
work?’. The High Court approved Mason’s CJ statement in Data Access 
Corporation v Powerflex Services Pty Ltd83 where it was held that ‘in 
determining whether something is a reproduction of a substantial part of a 
[copyright work], the essential features of the [work] should be ascertained 
by considering the originality of the part allegedly taken.’ The High Court 
referred to the definition of substantial part again in Network Ten Pty Ltd v 
TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd84. In this case Kirby J explained that a small 
portion in quantitative terms may constitute a substantial part having regard 
to its materiality in relation to the work as a whole.85 More recently in TCN 
Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd (No 2)86 it was held that 
whether a part taken is a substantial part or not, involves an assessment of 
the importance of the part taken to the work as a whole.  
 
Applying a strict approach to this test of qualitative importance, it would 
appear that where a recognisable portion of a song has been sampled then a 
substantial part will have been reproduced.87 However, applying a more 
liberal approach, a substantial part will only have been reproduced where 
                                                 
80 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 14(1). 
81 [1964] 1 WLR 273, 293.  
82 (1993) 176 CLR 300, 305. 
83 (1999) 45 IPR 353, [84].  On the approach taken  in the US see Newton v Diamond 
349 F. 3d. 591 at 594-6 (6th Cir 2003).  
84 (2004) 78 ALJR 585. 
85 Network Ten Pty Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2004) 78 ALJR 585, 605; see also 
McHugh ACJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ, 589; TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten 
Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] FCAFC 53 (Unreported, Sundberg, Finkelstein and Hely JJ, 26 
May 2005) [50]. 
86 [2005] FCAFC 53 (Unreported, Sundberg, Finkelstein and Hely JJ, 26 May 2005) 
[52] 
87 Mathew Alderson (ed), Current Issues in Music Law (1998) 62. 
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the sample takes a portion of the song which has led to its popular appeal or 
commercial success. This was alluded to in TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v 
Network Ten Pty Ltd (No 2) where Finkelstein J held that one of the 
determining factors is the economic significance of that which has been 
taken.88 While the issue of substantial part was not closely considered in 
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Miyamoto89, as the samples in question 
were entire songs, the recent United States decision in Bridgeport Music 
Inc v Dimension Films Inc,90 tends to favour the strict approach in 
determining what will amount to a substantial part. In this case the Court 
held that even where a small part of a sound recording is sampled, then the 
part taken is something of value and will therefore infringe copyright.91  
 
Another type of right which arises in relation to recorded music is that of 
performers’ rights. Previously under the Copyright Act performers had 
quite limited rights and did not obtain copyright in the sound recordings of 
their performances.92 However, as a result of the Australia-United States 
Free Trade Agreement and the enactment of the US Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act 2004 (Cth), significant changes have been made to the 
protection of performers’ rights under the Copyright Act. These changes 
have included extending the current ambit of performers’ rights by granting 
performers’ ownership of copyright in the sound recordings of their 
performances.93 This is in addition to the existing performers’ rights to 
authorise recording and broadcasting of the performance, and the right to 
prevent the knowing copy, sale, distribution or importation of unauthorised 
recordings.94 As a result of these changes to the Copyright Act the person at 
the time of recording who owned the record and the performer who 
performed the performance are now co-owners of the copyright in equal 
shares.95 It should also be noted that provisions have been introduced to 
prevent performers claiming compensation for infringement of copyright in 
                                                 
88 [2005] FCAFC 54 (Unreported, Sundberg, Finkelstein and Hely JJ, 26 May 2005) 
[12]. 
89 [2003] FCA 812 (Unreported, Lindgren J, 18 July 2003). 
90 401 F3d 647 (6th Cir, 2004); 410 F 3d 792 (6th Cir 2005). 
91 Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc, 401 F3d 647 at 658 (6th Cir, 2004); 410 
F 3d 792, 801-802 (6th Cir 2005). 
92 Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald, supra, 124. 
93 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 22(3A). 
94 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248G. 
95 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 97(2A). 
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a sound recording96 and for infringement of performers’ rights arising from 
the same event.97 
 
The other type of right which arises in regards to recorded music and has 
the potential to pose a significant obstacle for music sampling is that of 
moral rights. Moral rights are personal rights belonging to the author or 
creator of the copyright work, which exist independently from the 
economic rights mentioned above.98 Under the Copyright Act 1968 there 
are three types of moral rights which are recognised. These are the right of 
attribution of authorship, the right not to have authorship falsely attributed 
and the right of integrity of authorship.99 The first of these moral rights, the 
right of attribution of authorship involves the right to be identified as the 
author of the work if any ‘attributable acts’ are done in respect of the 
work.100 The second moral right provides the author of the work the right 
not to have authorship of the work falsely attributed.101 Given the nature of 
music sampling, it can be argued that the first of these moral rights is 
almost always infringed as musicians rarely credit the work they have 
sampled.102 However, further questions need to be asked as to whether the 
sampled material adequately identifies the moral rights holder103 or whether 
it was reasonable in all the circumstances not to identify the author?104  It 
should also be noted that the right of attribution only applies in relation to a 
substantial part of the work and therefore in instances where a substantial 
part has not been reproduced this will not be an issue.105 
 
The third moral right of integrity involves the right not to have the work 
subjected to derogatory treatment which would demean the creator’s 
                                                 
96 Under s 85 (1) and as distinct from performers protection, in order to prevents double 
dipping.  
97 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 248J(4), (5). 
98 Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald, supra, 118. 
99 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 189. 
100 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 193. 
101 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 195AC.  Under s 195AG (1) it is an act of false 
attribution for a person to  knowingly deal with an altered work or reproduction of an 
altered work as if it were the unaltered work or reproduction of an unaltered work of the 
author.  An insubstantial alteration is not covered by this provision: s 195 (2).  
102 Nicola Bogle, ‘Does Black and White Make Gray? A Critical Analysis of the Legal 
Regime Governing Digital Music Sampling’ (2005) 61 Intellectual Property Forum 10, 
17.  
103 Section 195  Copyright Act 1968. 
104 Section 195AR Copyright Act 1968. 
105 Section 195AZH Copyright Act 1968. 
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reputation.106 Once again the potential for infringement (in relation to the 
music and lyrics, but interestingly not the sound recording) arises as 
sampling by its very nature involves some degree of manipulation, which 
could lead to the demeaning of the creator’s reputation.107   However, the 
critical issue to determine is the extent to which digital sampling debases 
an original work.  Does taking a part of a sound recording and/or placing it 
in another context impact upon the integrity of the lyrics or the music?  As 
there are no moral rights in the actual sound recording,108 joined with the 
fact that a sound recording can be made of music and lyrics pursuant to a 
statutory licence (i.e. the author cannot veto the recording)109 there seems 
merit in the suggestion that the moral right of integrity in relation to 
recorded music must permit a broad range of approaches in the face of any 
attempt at creative censorship, although racist or other abhorrent forms of 
communication would be questionable.110 Once again it should be noted 
                                                 
106 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 195AQ. 
107 Bogle, above n 57.  
108 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 189. 
109 Sections 54-65 Copyright Act 1968. 
110 See further Matthew Rimmer, ‘The Grey Album: Copyright Law and Digital 
Sampling’ (2005) 114 Media International Australia 40, 48-50; Elizabeth Adeney, 
‘Moral Rights/Statutory Licence: The Notion of Debasement in Australian Copyright 
Law’ (1998) 9 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 36; Michael Blakeney and 
Fiona Macmillan ‘Journalistic Parody and Moral Rights under Australian Copyright 
Law’ (1998) 3 Media Arts and Law Review 124. The meaning of debasement (as 
provided for by s 55(2) Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) – no statutory licence permitted where 
debasement of the musical work occurs (no equivalent provision in s 59 Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) in relation to lyrics) - which was repealed by the Copyright Amendment 
(Moral Rights) Act 2000 (Cth)) was considered by the Federal Court of Australia in 
Schott Musik International GmbH & Co v Colossal Records of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 
37 IPR 1. This case concerned whether a techno adaptation of a musical work by the 
group Excalibur debased the original work. The Full Federal Court held that in 
assessing the notion of debasement the court must take a broad approach, paying due 
regard to the community’s wide spectrum of tastes and values. Accordingly, the techno 
adaptation was held not to have debased the original work. In Morrison Leahy Music 
Limited v Lightbond Limited [1993] EMLR 144 Morrit J held that the use of samples 
from an original work by George Michael did amount to derogatory treatment. In 
coming to this conclusion, Morrit J favoured the argument of the plaintiffs that the 
sampling of parts of the music had completely altered the character of the original work.  
In Confetti Records v Warner Music [2003] EWCh 1274 (Ch) [150] which concerned an 
alleged derogatory treatment of a composition in a remix by a UK garage band 
Lewinson J held ‘that the mere fact that a work has been distorted or mutilated gives 
rise to no claim, unless the distortion or mutilation prejudices the author’s honour or 
reputation.’ Here, the court was unable to find that the original author’s honour or 
reputation had been prejudiced, thus the claim for derogatory treatment failed. Would 
one be able to argue that the author’s moral rights of integrity in relation to music and 
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that the right of integrity only applies in relation to a substantial part of the 
work and therefore in instances where a substantial part has not been 
reproduced this will not be an issue.111 
 
It should also be noted that in accordance with US Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act 2004 (Cth) moral rights will extend to performers. 
Performers’ moral rights will include the right of attribution of 
performership, the right not to have performership falsely attributed and the 
right of integrity of performership. However, these changes are yet to come 
into effect, as they are contingent upon Australia’s obligations under the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty entering into force.  
 
Once it has been determined that an infringement has occurred we would 
then need to determine if a fair dealing exception relating to criticism, 
review, research, study or news reporting is applicable.112 It is generally 
accepted that the scope for a fair dealing argument under the current law in 
the context of sampling would be very small.113 In contrast the fair use 
doctrine in the US has supported some forms of ‘transformative’ sampling 
most notably in the area of parody.114 It is also important to note that the 
current fair dealing provisions in the Copyright Act do not remove liability 
for the infringement of moral rights.  
 
Sampling Case Law 
In Australia we have very little case law on the issue of sampling. The 
closest we have is Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Miyamoto115 a case 
where entire songs were sampled onto compilation style CDs and it is no 
                                                                                                                                               
lyrics were infringed in the critiquing rap recasting of Roy Orbison’s classic, ‘Oh Pretty 
Woman’ by 2 Live Crew, held to have the potential to be fair use by the US Supreme 
Court in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc 510 U.S 569  (1994)? 
111 Section 195AZH Copyright Act 1968. 
112 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 40-43, 103A, 103B, 103C, 104.  
113 See the analysis of the fair dealing provisions below in the context of MP3 Blogs. 
114 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc 510 U.S 569  (1994). See further Nicola Bogle, 
‘Does Black and White Make Gray? A Critical Analysis of the Legal Regime 
Governing Digital Music Sampling’ (2005) 61 Intellectual Property Forum 10 at 16-17; 
Matthew Rimmer, ‘The Grey Album: Copyright Law and Digital Sampling’ (2005) 114 
Media International Australia 40 at 44-5; B Challis,“The Song Remains the Same: A 
Review of the Legalities of Music Sampling” www.musicjournal.org; M Heins, NYU 
Free Expression Policy Project, “Trashing The Copyright Balance” (2004) 
http://www.fepproject.org/commentaries/bridgeport.html ; “Sixth Circuit Rejects De 
Minimis Defense to the Infringement of A Sound Recording Copyright” (2005) 118  
Harvard Law Review 1355.   
115 [2003] FCA 812 (Unreported, Lindgren J, 18 July 2003). 
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surprise that the Federal Court of Australia (Lindgren J.) was not prepared 
to entertain any excuses based on the concept of music sampling. Universal 
Music Australia Pty Ltd v Miyamoto116 concerned an action for copyright 
infringement  brought by a number of recording companies against fives 
DJ’s, who had remixed a number of tracks from different recordings and 
then produced a remix CD. The five DJ’s claimed that they had only 
produced the CD’s in order to raise their profiles and satisfy audience 
demand.117 Nonetheless Lindgren J held that the remix CD’s constituted 
copying of a substantial part of the sound recordings and therefore was an 
infringement of ss 101 and 103 of the Copyright Act.118 As this case 
concerned infringing samples that were entire songs and not smaller parts 
of songs the Court did not closely consider the crucial issue of what will 
amount to copying of a substantial part of a sound recording in the context 
of music sampling.   
 
In a later hearing for damages in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v 
Miyamoto119. Wilcox J scolded the five DJ’s for their flagrant disregard of 
the applicant’s rights.120 His Honour found that all five respondents had 
deliberately infringed copyright law for ultimate financial gain.121  He went 
on to further comment that there was a culture within the music industry of 
blatant disregard for copyright restrictions, based on an ill-conceived 
perception that sound recording companies were wealthy multinationals 
and therefore fair game.122  However, Wilcox J did acknowledge that ‘[i]f 
the respondents’ infringements of copyright had been limited to [the] 
creation of one or more of the compilation CDs for use only by the 
respondent himself, so as facilitate his presentation on a particular 
occasion, I would have taken a less serious view of the infringements.’123 
However, the decisive factor in this case was that the respondents went 
beyond the production of the compilation CDs for their own use.124 Instead, 
the respondents motivated by their own ultimate financial gain knowingly 
                                                 
116 [2003] FCA 812 (Unreported, Lindgren J, 18 July 2003). 
117 Universal Music Pty Ltd v Miyamoto [2004] FCA 982 (Unreported, Wilcox J, 30 
July 2004) [12]. 
118 Universal Music Pty Ltd v Miyamoto [2003] FCA 812 (Unreported, Lindgren J, 18 
July 2003) [23], [26]. 
119 [2004] FCA 982 (Unreported, Wilcox J, 30 July 2004). 
120 Universal Music Pty Ltd v Miyamoto [2004] FCA 982 (Unreported, Wilcox J, 30 
July 2004) [24]. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid [26]. 
124 Ibid. 
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trampled on the applicants’ rights, thereby infringing copyright.125 
Unfortunately this case does not provide clear guidance for digital 
sampling of smaller amounts of material.  
 
The recent US decision in Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc,126 
has thrown the law on sampling into somewhat of a spin. For years 
American and UK courts have allowed very small (de minimus) amounts of 
songs to be sampled but Bridgeport challenges that approach.127 In 
Bridgeport the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned 
a District Court finding that the very small (de minimus) amount of 
sampling in this case  did not amount to copyright infringement. At issue 
was the use of a sample from the rap song ‘100 Miles and Runnin’ in the 
sound track of the movie ‘I Got the Hook Up’. The allegedly infringing 
sample was a two second, three-note solo guitar ‘riff’ which was copied, 
the pitch lowered and then looped and extended to 16 beats.128 This sample 
then featured in five places with each looped segment lasting for 
approximately seven seconds. In an action for copyright infringement 
Higgins J of the Middle District Court of Tennessee held that the 
infringement was de minimis and therefore not actionable.129 However, this 
decision was overturned on appeal with the Court of Appeals for the 6th 
Circuit finding that ‘no substantial or de minimis inquiry should be 
undertaken at all when the defendant has not disputed that it digitally 
sampled a copyrighted sound recording.’130 Severely limiting the 
application of the notion of  de minimis use in cases concerning music 
samples, their Honours held that even where a small part of a sound 
recording is sampled, the part taken is something of value.131 In their view 
this was the only logical conclusion, since if you cannot pirate the whole 
sound recording there is no reason why you should be able to lift or sample 
                                                 
125 Ibid. 
126 401 F3d 647 (6th Cir, 2004); 410 F 3d 792 (6th Cir 2005). 
127 B Challis, “The Song Remains the Same: A Review of the Legalities of Music 
Sampling” www.musicjournal.org; Amici Curiae Brief of Brennan Center for Justice at 
NYU Law School and EFF in Bridgeport Rehearing  21 January 2005 
<http://www.fepproject.org/courtbriefs/bridgeport.pdf> 
128 Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc, 401 F3d 647, 652 (6th Cir, 2004); 410 
F 3d 792, 796 (6th Cir 2005). 
129 230 F Supp 2nd 830 (MD Tenn, 2002). 
130 Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc, 401 F3d 647, 654 (6th Cir, 2004); 410 
F 3d 792, 798 (6th Cir 2005). 
131 Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc, 401 F3d 647, 658 (6th Cir, 2004); 410 
F 3d 792, 801-802 (6th Cir 2005); TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Pty Ltd 
(No 2) [2005] FCAFC 53 (Unreported, Sundberg, Finkelstein and Hely JJ, 26 May 
2005) [19]. 
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something less than the whole.132 The message from Bridgeport Music Inc 
v Dimension Films Inc, is clear, ‘get a license or do not sample’.133  
 
The Court also made the point that their decision would not serve to stifle 
creativity as anybody was free to make a new sound recording of the 
composition.134 In their view sampling acts to provide a savings in 
production costs and should not be allowed at the expense of the person 
who made the original sound recording.135 This view to some extent 
underestimates the creative innovation involved in sampling and privileges 
the notion of the taking of value and saving of production costs.  
 
This decision appears to show a changing attitude within the courts in 
regards to music sampling infringements. Previously, courts had been 
willing to allow the use of music samples based on the legal maxim of de 
minimis, ‘the law cares not for trifles’. This was demonstrated in Newton v 
Diamond,136 where the majority held that the unauthorised use of a music 
sample by the group Beastie Boys, was de minimis and therefore not 
actionable. In reaching this decision the majority was of the opinion that 
the use of a brief sample, consisting of three notes separated by a half-step 
over a background C note, was insufficient to sustain a claim for copyright 
infringement.137 Admittedly Newton is a confusing precedent as the Beastie 
Boys had licenced the sound recording so what was in issue was simply the 
sampling of the music or score. There is conjecture over whether the strict 
approach of Bridgeport or the more flexible approach of Newton will 
become the dominant approach in the US,138 however, it is suggested that 
Australian courts in determining whether a substantial part has been 
reproduced should blend the reasoning of both cases.139   
 
                                                 
132 Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc, 401 F3d 647, 658 (6th Cir, 2004); 410 
F 3d 792, 801-802 (6th Cir 2005). 
133 Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc, 401 F3d 647, 657 (6th Cir, 2004); 410 
F 3d 792, 801 (6th Cir 2005). 
134 Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc, 401 F3d 647, 657 (6th Cir, 2004); 410 
F 3d 792, 801 (6th Cir 2005). 
135 Bridgeport Music Inc v Dimension Films Inc, 401 F3d 647, 657-658 (6th Cir, 2004); 
410 F 3d 792, 802 (6th Cir 2005). 
136 349 F 3d 591 (9th Cir, 2003). 
137 Newton v Diamond, 349 F 3d 591, 603 (9th Cir, 2003). 
138 See “Amici Curiae” Brief of Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law School and 
EFF in Bridgeport Rehearing  21 January 2005 
<http://www.fepproject.org/courtbriefs/bridgeport.pdf>. 
139 See further: “Sixth Circuit Rejects De Minimis Defense to the Infringement of A 
Sound Recording Copyright” (2005) 118  Harvard Law Review 1355.   
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MP3 Blogs 
 
What Are MP3 Blogs? 
 Since their inception in early 2003, MP3 blogs have rapidly become the 
latest evolution in how people choose to share their favourite music in the 
digital environment. The concept of an MP3 blog essentially involves the 
combination of an online journal, with a music column that features MP3 
music files that are available for download.140 Generally,  MP3 blogs 
contain one or two tracks from a CD album available for download. This is 
usually accompanied by the traditional blog which features a commentary 
or review on the track and the artist. Readers are then encouraged to 
download the music, read the accompanying review and share their 
thoughts online. The MP3 files that are contained on the blogs are generally 
either available for download directly from the blog itself or via a link to 
another site where the MP3 files have been uploaded. However, in most 
cases the MP3 files are usually only available to download for a couple of 
days. By their very nature most MP3 blogs tend to feature obscure ‘musical 
nuggets’, those hard to find often outdated tracks which are restricted to a 
particular musical sub-genre or theme. MP3 blogs tend to fall into two 
categories, those that provide music with the copyright owner’s permission 
and those that do not. It is the latter which will have implications for 
copyright law.   
 
What Does Copyright Law Allow? 
Thus far MP3 blogs have managed to avoid the wrath of the music industry 
and are therefore yet to be legally challenged.141 However, it is has been 
                                                 
140 Rick Ellis, MP3 Blogs Combine Reviews with Music Files (2004) NBC13 
Technology < http://www.nbc13.com/technology/3369203/detail.html#> at 8 April 
2005. 
141 Cf. Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions v Ng, Tran and Le (Unreported, 
Sydney Central Local Court, Henson DCM, 18 November 2003) where Peter Tran, 
Charles Ng and Tommy Le ran a website called MP3 WMA Land. The website 
essentially provided free MP3 music downloads to 390 commercially available CD 
albums and 946 singles. The site was said to have received some seven million hits 
during its operation, with an estimated loss to copyright holders of up to $200 million. 
The Court found the three defendants guilty under s 132(2)(b) of the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) for knowingly distributing copyrighted work, to an extent that prejudicially 
affects the owner of copyright. Tran and Ng both received prison sentences of 18 
months, suspended for three years; in addition to this Tran was fined $5000 and Ng and 
Le ordered to perform 200 hours community service. See also Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper [2005] FCA 972 (Unreported, Tamberlin J, 14 July 2005); 
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well documented that they exist within a so called legal grey area, and it 
may only be a matter of time before the law turns its attention to MP3 
blogs. Recently the Recording Industry Association of America stated that 
in terms of piracy MP3 blogs are an issue which they are closely 
monitoring and that at any time they could decide to make enforcement a 
priority.142 The main reason for the survival of MP3 blogs is their relatively 
low profile, with even the most popular MP3 blogs having only a few 
thousand regular visitors.143 This is a far cry from the millions of people 
who engage in peer to peer file sharing through programs like WinMx or 
Kazaa. In addition to this most MP3 blogs tend to feature music which is 
no longer termed as mainstream, and has often been out of the public eye 
for a long time.144 
 
However, despite these factors while MP3 blogs continue to feature tracks 
without the permission of the copyright owner they run the risk that they 
will infringe copyright law. Under the Copyright Act bloggers will infringe 
copyright when they do any of the acts within the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights.145 In the context of a sound recording, this will most often 
occur on MP3 blogs where the host blogger makes a copy of the sound 
recording or where they communicate the recording to the public by 
posting it to the blog.146 In this scenario – that is posting by the host 
blogger – there will also most likely be a copyright infringement of the 
musical and literary work, as well as the sound recording. This 
infringement in the musical and literary work will occur where the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights are infringed, by either reproducing the 
work in a material form, communicating the work to the public or 
performing the work in public.147  In light of the recent decision in 
Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper148 host bloggers also need to 
                                                                                                                                               
Universal Music Aistralia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 1242 
(Unreported, Wilcox J, 5 September 2005).  
142 Bill Werde, The Music Blog Boom (2004) Rolling Stone  
<h ttp://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/_/id/6478068? 
rnd=1095273257416&pageid=rs.Home&has- 
player=true&pageregion=single1&> at 18 April 2005. 
143 Wikipedia, MP3 Blog (2005) <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mp3_blog> at 8 April 
2005. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1), 101(1). 
146 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 85(1)(a), (c). The posting of the sampled work on the 
Internet might also infringe the copyright owner’s right to allow the recording to “be 
caused to be heard in public”: s 85 (1) (b).   
147 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 31 (1)(a). 
148 [2005] FCA 972 (Unreported, Tamberlin J, 14 July 2005). 
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be mindful of authorisation liability for facilitating copyright infringement 
through hypertext linking. 
 
Assuming an action for copyright infringement can be made out against an 
MP3 blog, one issue which does arise is whether MP3 blogs fall within the 
defence of fair dealing under the Copyright Act. In particular, it may be 
argued that MP3 blogs come within the fair dealing defence of criticism or 
review.149 Under this provision a musical or literary work or a sound 
recording may be fairly dealt with, without infringing copyright for the 
purposes of criticism or review.150 There is no definition of criticism or 
review within the Copyright Act, however, it has been held that the words 
criticism and review are of ‘wide and indefinite scope which should be 
interpreted literally.’151 In Warner Entertainment Co Ltd v Channel 4 
Television Corp PLC152 Henry LJ stated that the question to be answered in 
assessing whether a dealing is fair or not is ‘is the [work] incorporating the 
infringing material a genuine piece of criticism or review, or is it something 
else, such as an attempt to dress up the infringement of another’s copyright 
in the guise of criticism’. 
 
The issue which then arises is whether the commentary and review posted 
on MP3 blogs will be sufficient to constitute criticism and review under ss 
41 and 103A of the Copyright Act. Given the differing nature of each MP3 
blog it is not possible to provide one complete answer; rather each site will 
need to be assessed on a case by case basis. However, it is possible to 
identify a number of key indicators which may suggest whether the fair 
dealing defence of criticism or review will be applicable in a given case. 
The primary determining factor will be the amount of commentary which is 
featured on the MP3 blog itself. In the case where an MP3 blog contains 
quite detailed commentary, a court may be inclined to view it as a genuine 
piece of criticism or review. This is to be distinguished from those sites that 
do not contain detailed commentary and are likely to be viewed as an 
infringement of copyright. Another determining factor will be the number 
of tracks that are available for download on the MP3 blog. Where there are 
only one or two tracks available, a court may be more willing to allow the 
criticism or review defence. However, MP3 blogs which contain an entire 
album or a substantial number of tracks will most likely not be afforded the 
defence of fair dealing. In summary, it would appear that as a general 
                                                 
149 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 41, 103A. 
150 Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald, supra, 171. 
151 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Network Ten Ltd (2001) 50 IPR 335, [66].  
152 (1993) 28 IPR 459, 468. 
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guide, where an MP3 blog is prima facie nothing more than an attempt to 
disguise copyright infringement, the defence of fair dealing will not be 
allowed. However, if the MP3 blog is a genuine piece of criticism or 
review, and is on a small scale, then a court may be inclined to allow the 
fair dealing defence.  
 
 
Culture Jamming 
 
What Is Culture Jamming? 
Culture jamming is part of a movement; a desire to change how the world 
currently operates – where individuals are replaced by corporations in a 
culture of consumerism. The term culture jamming refers to a form of 
social and political activism, a resistance movement to the hegemony of 
popular culture which utilises the mass media to criticise and satirise those 
very institutions that control and dominate the mass media.153 Culture 
jammers are revolutionaries, they intend to incite and provoke social and 
political upheaval, ultimately for change.154 They are discontent with the 
control that politicians, corporations and capitalism have taken over the 
mass media and society in general and wish to free the public from what 
they see as a propagandised world. Their technique is to take conventional 
forms of mass communication such as corporate advertising and imitate the 
visuals, either logos or slogans, subtly altering the intended message to 
express dissenting opinions.155 Culture jamming may take a number of 
different forms and mediums however, it is mainly restricted to the internet, 
posters, billboards and personal apparel like t-shirts. Some popular 
examples of culture jamming include: 
• Subvertising – this involves undermining the authority of corporations 
and politicians that impose capitalism and consumerism, and 
sabotaging their efforts to control the minds of the public.156 
• Guerrilla communication – this is the intervention in the more 
conventional processes of communication in order to grab the 
audience’s attention and express unconventional views.  
                                                 
153 See generally: Communication Studies University of California, What is Culture 
Jamming? (2004) Culture Jamming <http://www.bol.ucla.edu/~nsajous/ > at 12 April 
2005; Kalle Lasn, Culture Jam: How to Reverse America’s Suicidal Consumer Binge – 
and why we must (1999) Eagle Press.  
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 For an example of subvertising see http://www.subvertise.org.   
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• Google bombing – this involves the manipulation of search engine 
results to link search keywords with negative or humiliating phrases 
and websites. 
• Billboard liberation – this is a practice used against corporate and 
political advertising, whereby critical and often cynical messages 
replace the original message while still remaining visually similar.157 
 
 
What Does The Law Allow?158 
It impossible to define all of the legal issues associated with culture 
jamming, as these will largely depend upon the medium or form in which 
the culture jamming takes. However, by using ‘billboard liberation’ as an 
example it is possible to identify a number of legal issues which may arise 
in similar cases of culture jamming. The first legal issue which may arise in 
this instance of culture jamming is the potential for the logo or slogan used 
in ‘billboard liberation’ to infringe copyright. Under the Copyright Act 
copyright infringement will occur where the culture jammer does any of the 
acts within the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.159 Using the example of 
‘billboard liberation’ this will most likely occur where the culture jammer 
either reproduces in a material form or communicates to the public an 
artistic work.160 An artistic work is defined to mean a painting, drawing or 
photograph, whether or not the work is of artistic quality.161 This definition 
will therefore incorporate the images and drawings which feature heavily in 
‘billboard liberation’. Where there is also accompanying text, this will also 
infringe copyright in the literary work when it is reproduced in a material 
form or communicated to the public.162 The text featuring in ‘billboard 
liberation’ will be classed as a literary work as it is a particular form of 
                                                 
157 For an example of billboard liberation see http://www.billboardliberation.com. 
158 Culture jamming may also lead to criminal charges or property based actions: see 
Pat O’Shane v John Fairfax & Sons [2004] NSWSC 140 (Unreported, Smart AJ, 16 
March 2004) [29] referring to a recent example of this in relation to a Berlei bra 
billboard.  
159 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1), 101(1). 
160 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 31(b). See Compagnie Generale des Etablissements 
Michelin “Michelin&Cie” v National Automobile Aeroscope, Transportation and 
General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) (T.D.) [1997] 2F.C. 306; British 
Columbia Automobile Assn v Office and Professional Employees International Union 
Local 378 [2001] B.C.J. No. 151.   
161 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1). 
162 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10(1). 
 175 
 
expression through which the ideas or information are conveyed.163  The 
scope for a defence of fair dealing based on parody is extremely limited 
and would most likely be unsuccessful.164  This form of culture jamming 
also has the potential to infringe the creator’s moral rights of attribution of 
authorship, the right not to have authorship falsely attributed and the right 
of integrity of authorship.165   
 
Another legal issue which arises in relation to ‘billboard liberation’ is the 
infringement of registered trade marks. In Australia protection is conveyed 
upon those trade marks which are registered under the Trade Marks Act 
1995 (Cth). Trade marks are defined as ‘a sign used, or intended to be used, 
to distinguish goods or services dealt with or provided in the course of 
trade by a person from goods or services so dealt with or provided by any 
other person’.166 This definition of a trade mark will therefore convey 
protection upon any ‘letter, word, name, signature, numeral, device, brand, 
heading, label, aspect of packaging, shape, colour, sound or scent’ 
providing it is distinctive.167  
 
                                                 
163 Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Co Ltd v Taylor (1937) 58 CLR 479; 
Blackie & Sons Ltd v Lothian Book Publishing Co Pty Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 396. Note 
that copyright will not usually subsist in very short titles, slogans or phrases although 
the law is inconsistent on this issue:  Anne Fitzgerald and Brian Fitzgerald, Intellectual 
Property in Principle (2004) Thomson Sydney 88-9; Jill McKeough, Andrew Stewart 
and Philip Griffith Intellectual Property in Australia 3rd ed (2005) LexisNexis 
Butterworths Sydney, 164-5. 
164 See Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelin “Michelin&Cie” v National 
Automobile Aeroscope, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-
Canada) (T.D.) [1997] 2F.C. 306 holding that “criticism” under the Canadian fair 
dealing provisions does not include parody; TCN Channel Nine v Network Ten (2001) 
50 IPR 335, [2001] FCA 108 at [66]; AGL Sydney Ltd v Shortland County Council 
(1989) IPR 99 at 105-6. cf. TCN Channel Nine v Network Ten (2002) 118  FCR 417, 
[2002] FCAFC 146 at [98]-[104], [116]; See generally Ellen Gredley and Spyros 
Maniatis, ‘Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of Parody and its Treatment 
in Copyright’ (1997) 7 European Intellectual Property Review 339. On the application 
of fair use doctrine in these circumstances see Leibovitz v Paramount Pictures 948 F 
Supp 1214 (SDNY, 1996).    
165 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 189; Ellen Gredley and Spyros Maniatis, ‘Parody: A 
Fatal Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of Parody and its Treatment in Copyright’ (1997) 7 
European Intellectual Property Review 339, 341, 344. 
166 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 17. 
167 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) ss 6, 41. 
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Prior to the introduction of a dilution styled provision into Australian 
trademark law168 in 1995 the trademark holder would have had to prove 
that culture jamming created consumer confusion as to the source of goods 
or services leading to an action for trademark infringement169  or passing 
off.170 Since the enactment of section 120(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 
(Cth) which provides protection for well known trade marks, which are 
typically owned by multinational corporations or national companies with a 
high market share,171 a registered trade mark will be infringed where a 
person uses a mark that is the same or deceptively similar to a well known 
mark as a trade mark (regarding unrelated goods or services) where use of 
the mark is likely to indicate a connection with the well known mark and 
thereby adversely affect the interests of the registered owner.172 
Interestingly the Canadian case of Compagnie Generale des Etablissements 
Michelin “Michelin & Cie” v National Automobile Aeroscope, 
Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) 
(T.D.)173 suggests s 22 of the Canadian Trade Marks Act – a dilution 
provision broadly similar to the Australian provision - would not be 
enlivened in parody situations as in such circumstances there is no “use of 
the mark as a trademark”.174  In the Michelin Case the NAATGW Union in 
seeking to recruit workers of the Michelin company depicted the Michelin 
man or ‘Bibendum’ (a marshmallow rotund figure composed of tyres) on 
leaflets distributed to workers in a manner so as to suggest he was just 
about to step on and squash a Michelin worker.   The Canadian Court of 
                                                 
168 On this notion see: B Fitzgerald and E Sheehan,  “Trademark Dilution and the 
Commodification of Information: Understanding the “Cultural Command”” (1999) 3 
Mac LR 61; TRIPS Art 16. 
169 Sections 120(1) and (2) Trade Marks Act 1995 ; Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald, supra, 
369-75; Mattel Inc v NCA Records Inc 296 F 3d 894 at 900 (9th Circ 2002) Cert. 
Denied 537 U.S. 1171 (2003); Elvis Presley Enterprises v Capece 141 F 3d 188  (5th 
Cir 1998).   
170 See generally: Mark Davison, Kate Johnston and Patricia Kennedy, Shanahan’s 
Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off (3rd ed, 2003) 571; Clark v Associated 
Newspapers Ltd [1998] 40 IPR 262 at 268. 
171 Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald, supra, 370. 
172 Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 120(3). To determine whether a mark is well known, 
it is necessary to consider the ‘extent to which the trade mark is known within the 
relevant sector of the public, whether as a result of the promotion of the trade mark or 
for any other reason’: s 120(4). 
173 [1997] 2F.C. 306 
174 See further British Columbia Automobile Assn v Office and Professional Employees 
International Union Local 378 [2001] B.C.J. No. 151; M Bibic and V Eatrides, “Would 
Victoria’s Secret Be Protected North of the Border? A Revealing Look at Trade-Mark 
Infringement and Depreciation of Goodwill in Canada” (2003) 93 The Trademark 
Reporter 904.  
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Appeal held that this was not trademark infringement of any kind but was a 
substantial reproduction of copyright material and therefore an 
infringement of Canadian copyright law.  The Michelin Case would 
suggest that in Australia in most instances using a trademark for the 
purpose of parody would not infringe s 120 (3) as it would not be “use of a 
mark as a trademark.”175  This would allow some forms of ‘billboard 
liberation’ but copyright infringement could still be an issue.  However as 
dilution laws aim to protect the value of the well known mark and 
ridiculing potentially devalues a mark, arguments for infringement will 
continue to be made and until there is a clear ruling on this issue there can 
be no certainty that the Canadian approach will be fully adopted in 
Australia.176  
 
As well known trademarks become part of our constructed reality and 
cultural environment one school of thought suggests we should have a 
broader right to access and utilise them as part of cultural discourse.177 A 
number of US cases have considered the issue as to what extent a well 
known trade mark may be reproduced or re-used as a medium of 
expression or a part of free culture. In Lucasfilm Ltd v High Frontier,178  
George Lucus unsuccessfully tried to bring an action for trade mark 
infringement against public interest groups who had labelled Ronald 
Reagan’s plans for outer-spaced weaponry, ‘Star Wars’. The court held that 
despite the fact that the original meaning derived from the trade use, courts 
cannot regulate descriptive non-trade use, without becoming language 
police. The court further held that trade marks laws are designed to regulate 
unfair trade competition, not the development of the English language in 
everyday human discourse.  This case can be contrasted with San 
Francisco Arts & Athletic Inc (SFAA) v US Olympics Committee 
(USOC),179 where the US Supreme Court held that SFAA’s promotion of 
an event called the ‘Gay Olympic Games’ was in breach of the Amateur 
Sports Act which allowed USOC to prohibit commercial and promotional 
                                                 
175 Fitzgerald and Fitzgerald supra, 372-5; Philmac Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trademarks 
[2002] FCA 1551; Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect Distributors Ltd [1999] FCA 1721; The 
Australian Steel Company Operations Pty Ltd v Steel Foundations Ltd [2003] FCA 374.  
176 E Gredley and S Maniatis, “Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 2: Trade Mark 
Parodies” [1997] 8 European Intellectual Property Review 412 at 419-20. 
177 P. Loughlan, Intellectual Property: Creative and Marketing Rights (1998) LBC 
Information Services, Sydney 168ff.; R. Dreyfuss, ‘Expressive Genericity: Trademarks 
as Language In the Pepsi Generation’ (1990) 65 Notre Dame Law Review 397; B 
Fitzgerald and E Sheehan,  “Trademark Dilution and the Commodification of 
Information: Understanding the “Cultural Command” (1999) 3 Mac LR 61. 
178 622 F Supp 931 (1985). 
179 483 US 522 (1987). 
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use of the word ‘Olympic’. In this instance free speech and cultural 
discourse reasoning, that the word was now part of the common language, 
was rejected by the US Supreme Court.  
 
In relation to parody the US courts have tended to allow trademarks to be 
reproduced on goods and even sold so long as it is a ‘take off’ and not a 
‘rip off’.180 However the introduction of a federal trademark dilution law 
has brought some uncertainty in the case law as to the legality of parody, 
yet there seems to be a clear argument that ‘non commercial speech’ (in 
essence social commentary) involving a mark is protected by the First 
Amendment and such use will not amount to dilution.181  The critical 
question will be whether parody devalues the mark? And if the answer is 
yes, the further question will be whether the parody devalues the mark in 
its ability to draw consumers or only within a broader social 
consciousness?182  
 
In terms of ‘billboard liberation’ which features a political message, it is 
necessary to consider the implied guarantee to free political speech. The 
courts have held that there is an implied freedom to communicate on 
political matters under the Commonwealth Constitution.183 The implied 
freedom to communicate on political matters protects individuals against 
laws that would otherwise restrict this freedom. This body of law may 
therefore provide a defence to any action against a form of culture jamming 
which contains a political message.   
 
                                                 
180 Nike Inc v “Just Did It” Enterprises 6 F3d 1225, 1227-8 (7th Cir, 1993); The Coca 
Cola v Co v Gemini Rising Inc 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Anheuser-Busch 
Inc. v L & L Wings Inc 962 F. 2d 316 (4th Cir. 1992); G Mayers “Trademark Parody: 
Lessons from The Copyright Decision in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc” (1996) 60 
L & Contemp. Probs. 181. 
181 See Mattel Inc v Walking Mountain Productions 353 F. 3d. 792 (9th Cir 2004); 
Mattel Inc v NCA Records Inc 296 F 3d 894 (9th Circ 2002) Cert. Denied 537 U.S. 
1171 (2003);  Dr Seuss Enterprises v Penguin Books USA 109 F 3d 1394 (9th Cir 
1997); E Gredley and S Maniatis, “Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 2: Trade Mark 
Parodies” [1997] 8 European Intellectual Property Review 412.   
182 British Columbia Automobile Assn v Office and Professional Employees 
International Union Local 378 [2001] B.C.J. No. 151 at [165]-[168]; Mattel Inc v 
Walking Mountain Productions 353 F. 3d. 792 at 812 (9th Cir 2004); Mattel Inc v NCA 
Records Inc 296 F 3d 894 at 902-7 (9th Circ 2002) Cert. Denied 537 U.S. 1171 (2003).   
183 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television 
Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times 
Ltd (1994) CLR 104; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 
520.  
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It is suggested that a clearer principle needs to be embodied in Australian 
copyright and trade mark law to allow broader social and cultural use of 
trademarks and reduce the threat of being sued.   
 
 
What Does the Future Hold? 
 
Introduction 
The great dilemma that faces the spirit of social or cultural innovation in 
Australia is the degree to which the law can respond to iron out these 
apparent roadblocks. One group – the owners - would feel happy having an 
enormous power of censorship and control over ‘appropriation’ or at least a 
statutory licensing scheme providing some remuneration while creatives 
and social innovators seek to harness the power of ‘remix’ to build out the 
future. One of the most powerful concepts that has arisen to assist creativity 
and social innovation is that of the Creative Commons. The CC movement 
asks copyright owners to consider sharing copyright material where 
appropriate and for stated purposes and aims to set up a mechanism for 
clearly articulating such a process of sharing in the Internet world. On the 
back of this the Australian government has realised that copyright law is 
too inflexible and has sought to re-examine the way in which certain re-
uses of copyright material without permission of the copyright owner 
should be facilitated. CC gives permission in advance and a more flexible 
fair dealing doctrine morphing into a fair use doctrine would provide a 
space where creatives and social innovators could harness to ‘some degree’ 
the existing store of knowledge and culture without permission of the 
copyright owner. This ability to negotiate copyright material upon the 
instance of seeing it and to innovate upon it and republish/distribute it 
provides a dynamic that the digital environment sponsors in a process of 
creative and social innovation.  In terms of trademarks we need to consider 
reform of the law to more clearly articulate what type of re-use should be 
allowed. 
 
Creative Commons 
In 2004 the Creative Commons (CC) project was launched in Australia: 
(http://creativecommons.org.au). Creative Commons aims to build a 
distributed information commons by encouraging copyright owners, where 
appropriate, to licence use of their material through open content licensing 
protocols and thereby promote better identification, negotiation and 
reutilization of content for the purposes of creativity and innovation. It 
aims to make copyright content more ‘active’ by ensuring that content can 
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be reutilized with a minimum of transactional effort. As the project 
highlights, the use of an effective identification or labeling scheme and an 
easy to understand and implement legal framework is vital to furthering 
this purpose.  This is done by establishing generic protocols or license 
terms for the open distribution of content that can be attached to content 
with a minimum of fuss under a CC label.  In short the idea is to ask 
copyright owners – where willing - to ‘license out’ or distribute their 
material on the basis of four protocols designed to enhance reusability and 
build out the information commons.184  
 
Through the Creative Commons licences a copyright owner of content, be 
it text, music or film, can place that material in the commons. These base 
licences have been ‘ported’ or adapted to Australian law as they have in a 
number of other countries throughout the world.185 The CC licences 
provide that anyone can use the content subject to one or a number of the 
following conditions186: 
• attribution of the author;  
• non-commercial distribution; 
• that no derivative materials based on the licensed material are made 
(i.e. all copies are verbatim); and 
• share and share alike (others may distribute derivative materials based 
on the licensed material under a licence identical to that which covers 
the licensed material). 
 
It is also important to point out that moral rights are asserted under the core 
terms of the current Australian version of the CC licence. While this 
presents a challenge for remix culture it is anticipated that further options 
regarding moral rights will be presented in future versions.187  
                                                 
184 On the key motivations for sharing content see: B Fitzgerald ‘Structuring Knowledge 
Through Open Access: The Creative Commons Story’ in C Kapitzke and B Bruce (eds.) 
New Libraries and Knowledge Spaces: Critical Perspectives on Information Education 
(2005) Lawrence Erlbaum and Assoc.  
185 <http://creativecommons.org/international>  <http://creativecommons.org.au> 
186 All of the conditions are presented as options which the licensor  may choose, except 
for the attribution condition which is now a default condition in each Creative 
Commons licence. 
187 B Fitzgerald, “Creative Commons (CC): Accessing, Negotiating and Remixing 
Online Content”, in J. Servaes and P. Thomas (eds), Communications, Intellectual 
Property and the Public Domain in the Asia Pacific Region: Contestants and Consensus 
(forthcoming 2006) Sage New Delhi. 
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The licence can be presented in common, legal or digital code language – 
by simply going to creativecommons.org and choosing a licence online.  
This is then linked to the work that you wish to give or licence out through 
the commons.  Creativecommons.org reports there have been over 53 
million ‘link-backs’ to Creative Commons licences (including over 20 000 
to the Australian licence) in ways that has further promoted creativity, 
innovation and education.188 
Like the free software movement, Creative Commons uses intellectual 
property rights as the platform on which to structure downstream user 
rights. By claiming copyright in the content that will go into the commons 
the owner can determine how that content can be used downstream e.g. to 
further develop the commons. However, unlike copyleft free software 
licences, Creative Commons does not require utilisation of material in the 
commons to carry with it an obligation to share further innovations back to 
the commons – this is only one of the four conditions, known as ‘share and 
share alike’, the copyright owner might employ.189  
Creative Commons cannot solve all of the legal issues associated with 
digital sampling and culture jamming. However, what it will enable is the 
‘building of active and distributed repositories of copyright content that can 
be utilised by creatives to build the next layer of creativity.’190 It is through 
the building of these repositories that Creative Commons will enable music 
samplers to sample and culture jammers to jam freely, without the fear of 
litigation.   
 
In relation to music CC has developed three different types of sampling 
licences (which are yet to be ported or translated into an Australian 
licence): 
 
1. The Sampling Licence - This licence allows users to use part of the 
licensed material for any purpose other than advertising, but does not 
allow users to perform, display or distribute copies of the whole of 
the licensed material for any purpose. 
                                                 
188 For example see <http://www.onlineopinion.com.au>  <http://www.vibewire.net.au> 
<http://creativecommons.org.au> 
189 See generally Anne Fitzgerald and Brian Fitzgerald, Intellectual Property in 
Principle (2004) Thomson Sydney  455. 
190 Brian Fitzgerald and Ian Oi, ‘Free Culture: Cultivating the Creative Commons’ 
(2004) 9(2) Media and Arts Law Review 137 at 140; Brian Fitzgerald, ‘Creative 
Choices: Changes to the Creative Commons’ (2005) 114 Media International Australia 
83.  
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2. The Sampling Plus Licence - This licence allows users to use part 
of the licensed material for any purpose other than advertising.  It 
also allows users to perform, display and distribute copies of the 
whole of the licensed material for non-commercial purposes. 
3. The Noncommercial Sampling Plus Licence - This licence allows 
users to use the whole or a part of the licensed material for non-
commercial purposes191 
  
In November 2004 Wired Magazine released a CD containing a collection 
of 16 songs all distributed under the Creative Commons sampling licenses 
– thirteen under the sampling plus license and three under the non 
commercial sampling plus license. The CD jacket encouraged readers to 
‘rip, mix, burn and swap till you drop’,192 activities which would otherwise 
have been prevented under the ‘all rights reserved’ copyright regime 
normally associated with the distribution of CDs.  The release of the Wired 
CD symbolised more than just the free sharing of music, with 16 high 
profile artists recognising by ‘doing’ that sharing digital culture can be an 
advantage and not a threat.193  
 
It must be noted that in Australia musicians that are members of certain 
collecting societies will not have the ability to utilise CC licences without 
the permission of the relevant collecting society. The Australian 
Performing Right Association194 (APRA) takes an assignment of the rights 
of public performance and communication to the public, which subsist in 
musical works and lyrics.195 The Australasian Mechanical Copyright 
Owners’ Society (AMCOS) takes an exclusive licence over mechanical 
rights in relation to music and lyrics, including the right to make 
recordings.196 The rights granted to both APRA and AMCOS cover all 
present and future music and lyrics owned by the member.197 Accordingly, 
a member of APRA is generally not the owner of the right of public 
performance or communication to the public in his or her music and lyrics, 
                                                 
191 <creativecommons.org> 
192 Thomas Goetz, Sample the Future (2004) Wired Magazine  
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.11/sample.html > at 15 April 2005.  
193 Ibid. 
194 <http://www.apra.com.au> 
195 Australasian Performing Rights Association, Constitution, cl 17 
<http://www.apra.com.au/corporate/downloads/APRA%20Constitution%2005.pdf> 
196 AMCOS Membership Agreement, cl 2 
<http://www.apra.com.au/writers/downloads/input_agreement-
applicationformindividual5Nov2004.pdf> 
197 APRA Constitution, cl 17(a); AMCOS Membership Agreemeent, cl 1.1.1. 
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and is thus unable to negotiate rights under a Creative Commons licences, 
without APRA’s permission. Likewise, a member of AMCOS is unable to 
give a license over the mechanical rights in his or her music and lyrics 
without the permission of AMCOS.198 Both APRA and AMCOS provide 
methods for musicians to opt-out of collection of royalties in one or more 
of a limited number of categories, or to have the rights in a particular work 
licensed back to them for a particular purpose. ‘Opt-out’ means that the 
collecting society will re-assign a subset of the public performance, 
communication or mechanical rights for every work owned by the member, 
and will cease collecting from the relevant streams.199 It is not possible to 
opt-out for a smaller number of works, and a minimum of 3 months notice 
is required for a re-assignment. ‘Licence-back’ means the creator is granted 
a non-exclusive license to a particular work for a particular performance or 
set of performances, or for a particular recording or other purpose.200 
Because the licence granted is limited in duration and scope, it is not 
sufficient for use with Creative Commons licences. A similar situation 
exists in some parts of Europe yet there is much more flexibility under the 
collection mechanisms established in the US. 
 
More work needs to be done on developing a flexible mechanism for 
allowing musicians to negotiate rights under CC licences while still 
maintaining a workable model for the relevant collecting societies. This is a 
complex issue and CC will need to adequately address criticisms such as 
the interests of the musician are best met through an organised collecting 
mechanism, CC may not be in anybody’s best interests and the existing 
system does not distinguish between commercial and non commercial 
performances.201  Much of this criticism is a legacy of entrenched business 
models and consequently denies, as if it were a disruptive technology,202 
the potential of free culture.  
 
In summary if you are a member of APRA or AMCOS the dynamic CC 
infrastructure is not available to you unless those organisations allow you 
to use it. Your American counterparts are not limited in this manner and 
                                                 
198 Members of AMCOS are generally music publishers, but Individuals can apply for 
AMCOS membership if they do not have a publisher. 
199 APRA Constitution, cl 17(c); AMCOS Membership Agreement, cl 2.6. 
200 APRA Constitution, cl 17(g); AMCOS Membership Agreement, cl 2.6.6. 
201 Emma Pike, “What you need to know about Creative Commons” M (15 March 2005) 
<www.bmr.org/html/news/news53.htm>; S Faulder, “What Creative Commons Really 
Means for Writers” (2005)  Music Week <www.cisac.org> 
202 See further: Clayton Christensen,  The Innovators Dilemma (1997) Harvard Business 
School Press, Boston MA 
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many would see this as a distinct yet odd advantage in a free trade world 
where Australia and the US have sought to build an harmonious intellectual 
property law. If you are not an APRA or AMCOS member your music can 
be shared at your choice in the creative commons.    
 
Fair Use Reform 
On the 18 February 2005 the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Phillip 
Ruddock announced a review of copyright law to examine whether a fair 
use exception should be  added to the Copyright Act.203 In a speech 
outlining the Australian Government’s copyright agenda for the next year, 
the Attorney-General acknowledged that some user groups expressed 
support for the introduction of ‘an open ended exception to copyright 
similar to the fair use provision in the United States.’204 In response to the 
changing nature of copyright, the Attorney-General said that ‘a fair use 
provision may give the Copyright Act more flexibility to maintain the 
copyright balance in a digital environment.’205 
 
There is no doubt that reform to this aspect of the Copyright Act is long 
overdue, and that the introduction of a fair use provision similar to that 
contained in  United States law will go a long way towards solving the 
legal issues created by digital sampling and culture jamming.206 The current 
fair dealing provisions in the Copyright Act are no longer capable of 
providing genuine fair dealing of content in the digital environment.207 This 
is largely due to the fact that the current provisions are limited to a narrow 
range of activities which do not reflect the potential of the digital 
environment.208  
 
                                                 
203 Attorney-General Phillip Ruddock, ‘Copyright: New Futures, New Agendas’ 
(Speech delivered at the Australian Centre for Intellectual Property and Agriculture 
Conference, Brisbane, 18 February 2005).  
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/speeches 
204 Ibid. at [38] 
205 Ibid. at [39]; see further Brian Fitzgerald, ‘Underlying Rationales of Fair Use: 
Simplifying the Copyright Act’ (1998) 2 Southern Cross University Law Review 153, 
157. 
206 See further, B Fitzgerald “Fair Use for “Creative Innovation”: A Principle We Must 
Embrace.  A Submission in Response to the A-G’s Issues Paper on Fair Use and Other 
Copyright Exceptions” (2005) 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/staff/lsstaff/fitzgerald.jsp 
207 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 40-43, 103A, 103B, 103C, 104. 
208 See also Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] Ch 685 at 697-8 affirmed on appeal 
[2002] Ch. 149 at 171.  
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What is required is the introduction of a single open-ended fair use defence 
which is sufficiently flexible to adapt to new uses that emerge with 
technological developments, but also certain enough to provide guidance to 
copyright owners and users.209 The harsh reality of the current Copyright 
Act is that even inconspicuous acts such as transferring music files to an 
iPod or making a back up copy of a CD are most likely an infringement of 
copyright.210 These two common place activities while graphic 
demonstrations of the dire need for reform are merely the tip of the iceberg.    
 
In implementing any doctrine of fair use the parliament needs to be mindful 
that fair use will not be thwarted by moral rights.211 In a digital remix world 
the moral rights of attribution and integrity provide significant challenges 
to innovation and need to be carefully implemented. As some American 
scholars suggest moral rights are a transaction cost in the negotiation of 
culture and have the potential to stifle free speech in the spirit of 
censorship.212 While acknowledging the value of moral rights we must 
guard against this potential in the remix world lest nothing will ever be 
remixed or transformed in a process of social comment and/or creativity.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As this article highlights the legality of the digital sampling of music needs 
to be clarified in order to sponsor creative and social innovation213 by: 
• clearly articulating how the notion of ‘substantial part’ will apply to 
music sampling.   What amounts to a substantial part is yet to be 
clearly settled by the Australian courts and until this occurs this area of 
activity will be chilled by a lack of certainty and fear of being sued. If 
we are serious about creative innovation as an economic and cultural 
driver then we need to provide clear legislative or judicial guidance on 
                                                 
209 Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions’, Issues 
Paper, May 2005, 33; Copyright Law Review Committee, Simplification of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) Report: Part 1 (1998) <www.clrc.gov.au> 
210 Ruddock, supra at [40] 
211 The the scope of  “reasonableness” under s 195 AS will be important to this 
question:  K Giles, “Mind the Gap: Parody and Moral Rights” (2005) 18 AIPLB 69 
212 Consider W Fisher, “Property and Contract on the Internet” (1999) 73 Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 1203  
213 On creative and social innovation see: L Lessig, Free Culture (2004); John Howkins, 
The Creative Economy: how people make money from ideas, (2001); John Hartley (ed.), 
Creative Industries (2005); DCITA, Creative Industries Cluster Study Volumes 1-3 
(2004) ww.dcita.gov.au ; Ruddcok supra at [8]. 
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what is allowed. A legislative solution could articulate the boundaries 
of sampling without permission of the copyright owner shading into a 
scheme where permission and compensation might be needed.  
• promoting the use of permission in advance mechanisms like Creative 
Commons licences where appropriate and encouraging collecting 
societies to support these initiatives 
• the introduction of a broad based fair use doctrine sponsoring parody 
and transformative use that does not fundamentally detract from the 
market of the original material.  Sampling for purely private purposes 
should also be covered however a broad based exception for non 
commercial sampling would not be acceptable to many copyright 
owners or collecting societies as the sample could too easily be 
communicated to or caused to be heard by the public thereby 
damaging the market for the original material.  
• the availability of responsive and flexible commercial licensing 
mechanisms, whether statutory or otherwise, for sampling that will not 
be covered by the suggestions above 
 
In relation to culture jamming we need to clearly articulate what copyright 
and trademark law will allow.  A fair use provision that covered both 
would be welcomed. Section 122 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 should be 
amended to provide an exception for defined areas of activity such as 
culture jamming. This should be mirrored in the Copyright Act. 214   
 
The very heart of intellectual property law is about seeking a workable 
balance between the interests of many players in society – creators, owners, 
commercialising agents, performers, users, social commentators and the 
community to name a few. To this end Australian intellectual property law 
should allow some degree of sampling and culture jamming for no cost and 
without anyone’s permission as this type of activity is the raw material of 
creative and social innovation. The time to address these issues seems to be 
well and truly upon us. 
                                                 
214 See for example the French and Spanish copyright law models. Under French 
copyright law an author may not prohibit a parody, pastiche or caricature. However, this 
exemption only applies if the parody imitates the work with humorous intent and does 
not create any confusion, injury or degrade the original author. Similarly, under Spanish 
copyright law parody is exempted from the author’s right of adaptation, provided it does 
not confuse or harm the original work: Ellen Gredley and Spyros Maniatis, ‘Parody: A 
Fatal Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of Parody and its Treatment in Copyright’ (1997) 7 
European Intellectual Property Review 339, 343-4. 
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Note on developments since 2005 
 
Since this paper was presented in early 2005 amendments have been introduced to the 
Australian Copyright Act 1968 through the Copyright Amendment Act 2006. Some of 
these amendments alter the legal position regarding reuse of copyright material under 
Australian law. 
 
For example, the Act now includes exceptions that permit: 
• the reproduction of copyright material for the purpose of watching it at a more 
convenient time (ie time shifting) – s.111; 
• the reproduction of copyright material in different formats for private use (ie format 
shifting) – ss.43C, 47J, 109A, 110AA; and 
• the use of copyright material for certain specified purposes (eg by libraries and 
archives, by educational institutions, or for persons with a disability) – s.200AB. 
 
One change that potentially works in favour of those wishing to remix copyright material 
is the introduction of new exceptions that allow fair dealings for the purpose of parody 
and satire (ss.41A and 103AA). 
 
However, the amendments also make a number of changes to the criminal provisions of 
the Act that serve to lower the bar for the application of criminal penalties for copyright 
infringement in Australia (ss.132AA-AT). As a consequence, they increase the legal risk 
to those distributing material over the internet.  
 
This new environment and the uncertainty it creates for those wishing to reuse existing 
material serves to emphasise the importance of open content licensing as a method of 
facilitating innovation and creativity in the digital age. 
